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Don’t Tread on Me: The Need for an
Alternate Dispute Resolution Process
for the Creators and Uploaders of
User-Generated Content
Scott A. Tarbell1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that this millennium has witnessed the technological
advent of new forms of communication that facilitate the exchange and
sharing of ideas. Among this trend has been the introduction of what can be
termed User Generated Content (UGC) sites created by online service
providers (OSPs), where users can upload and display their works for public
consumption. Although some websites already existed to allow users to
share their works and witness the creations of others, it was not until around
2005 that UGC sharing was adopted for serious mainstream use in any
meaningful capacity.2 An important pioneer in this transformation was
YouTube. Founded in 2005,3 this OSP rapidly grew into a multi-billion
dollar industry and was purchased by Google in 2006 for $1.65 billion.4
Giving people free access to a place where they could upload and share their

1. J.D. Candidate 2014, Pepperdine University School of Law.
2. See YouTube Hits 100m Videos Per Day, BBC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2006, 10:59 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5186618.stm; Rob Hof, YouTube: 100 Million Videos a Day,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Jul.
14,
2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2006/07/youtube_100_mil.html. While
blogs and review sites certainly existed prior to 2005 and were gaining in popularity, they were
quickly overshadowed by YouTube’s explosive success, which only a year after its inception was
already uploading approximately 100 million videos a day. See YouTube Hits 100m Videos Per
DayDocument1: Hof.
3. About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Sept.
21, 2013).
4. See generally Associated Press, Google buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, MSNBC (Oct. 10,
2006, 10:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15196982/ns/business-us_business/t/google-buysyoutube-billion/#.UJQo08XA-Jo; Google Buys YouTube for $1.65bn, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006,
4:03 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6034577.stm.
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thoughts and ideas to anyone with an online connection proved to be one of
the most lucrative ventures for an Internet that had just stepped out of its
nascency.
However, along with the newfound ability to submit UGC onto
YouTube’s servers came the inevitable problem of copyright infringement—
at some point it became obvious that not all videos uploaded or even all
parts of certain videos were going to be free from claims of infringement by
copyright holders. Although YouTube alerted users that they must own the
rights to the material or have the necessary permission for anything
submitted to YouTube’s servers5, users continued to upload copyrighted
material anyway. Initially, YouTube did not provide any real analysis of
videos uploaded,6 instead opting to wait for copyright holders to submit
takedown notices pursuant to statutory provisions listed under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The precarious situation YouTube
found itself in could not continue as the status quo forever, and before long
groups and individuals began to file lawsuits against YouTube claiming that
the OSP was responsible for the copyright infringement of its users.7
One such group was Viacom International.8 A few months after the
conglomerate initiated a suit against YouTube in 2007 alleging failure on the
OSP’s part in maintaining proper vigilance in combating copyright
infringement,9 YouTube in turn introduced its Content ID program10 in an
attempt to ameliorate its ability to detect infringement and mollify
excoriating claims that the OSP was profiting off of pirated material.11 For
Content ID to work, copyright holders deliver to YouTube a variety of their
content reference files and any necessary metadata (descriptive information
about the data itself) and state what they would like YouTube to do should
5. Upload Video Files, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/my_videos_upload (last visited
Sept. 21, 2013). At the upload screen, YouTube warns users that they “must own the copyright or
have the necessary rights for any content” they upload. Id.
6. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. YouTube’s Content ID program, which
checked the content uploaded by users on its own without requiring a prior copyright holder
takedown notice, did not exist until 2007. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 562 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2009); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Eugene C. Kim, YouTube: Testing
the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 143–44 (2007).
8. See supra note 7.
9. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28, 28 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012). The
charges by Viacom alleged direct and secondary copyright infringement, the latter of which included
“contributory, vicarious, and inducement liability.” Id.
10. Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST. J. (Jun.
12, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118161295626932114.html.
11. See Cory Doctorow, The Pirates of YouTube, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011, 10:27 AM),
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/dec/12/pirates-of-youtube-cory-doctorow (“Running Content
ID isn’t a legal duty, it’s an olive branch extended by YouTube to the audiovisual industries.”).

28

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss1/2

2

Tarbell: Don't Tread on Me: The Need for an Alternate Dispute Resolution P

[Vol. 14: 27, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Content ID locate a match.12 Options available for copyright holders are: (1)
monetize, (2) track, or (3) block.13 “Monetize” will institute ads around the
video playing itself, or ads that play prior to the video requested; “track” has
YouTube record the viewing metrics of the video; and, lastly, “block”
culminates in an automated takedown of the video.14
YouTube has a three-strike policy,15 with each strike attached to an
account whenever infringing material is taken down. Should a user account
garner three strikes in which either: (1) YouTube’s own Content ID
registered a match between uploaded material and protected content or (2)
YouTube removed uploaded material via a copyright holder’s takedown
notice, the user account will be taken offline along with any other uploaded
materials still attached to the account.16 A notice is sent to alert the user
each time alleged infringing content is taken down.17
To fully appreciate the consequences of this policy, it is necessary that
the details are addressed more closely. This article analyzes the current
position that UGC site users find themselves in relation to their ability to
dispute copyright infringement claims. Part II discusses the introduction and
purpose of the DMCA along with the statutory provisions and case law
relevant to the subject. Part III covers the underlying issues encumbering the
current appeals process for the OSPs as dictated under the DMCA, and why
changes are required. Part IV advocates for a new dispute process, one in
favor of online alternative dispute resolution (ODR), and explains how this
new paradigm would produce more equitable results for UGC site users.
Finally, Part V lists further changes that would be necessary in order to
ensure that ODR exists as (and continues in the future to be) a more viable,

12. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals (last visited Sept. 21,
2013); Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
13. See supra note 12.
14. See supra note 12.
15. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 12 (“The takedown notice will also count
as a “strike” on your account – after three strikes, YouTube will cancel all of your YouTube
accounts and remove all of your videos.”).
16. Copyright
Strike
Basics,
YOUTUBE,
http://support.google.com/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2814000 (last visited Sept. 21,
2013).
17. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 12 (“The reason for the removal of a video
is usually mentioned in the email that YouTube sends to the account holder regarding the removal. . .
. The message also should appear in your YouTube mailbox, so check there as well.”).
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equitable, and less expensive process for resolving YouTube-like OSP
copyright infringement disputes than the current system presently allows.
II. THE CREATION OF THE DMCA AND ITS PROVISIONS
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 in order to modernize existing
copyright law, assist copyright holders in taking down infringing material,
and provide OSPs with statutory safe harbor provisions.18 The safe harbor
provisions were enacted to assist OSPs, which had been long-suffering from
years of copyright infringement claims brought by copyright holders, in
obtaining legal immunity so long as they complied with the mandates
within.19 Located under section 512 of the Copyright Act, four subsections
cover four different categories of OSPs and list the respective requirements
that OSPs in each category must meet to obtain and maintain safe harbor
immunity from copyright infringement claims.20
Under the DMCA, an OSP is defined as “a provider of online services
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,”21 which includes
entities “offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications .†.†. of the user’s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”22 The safe
harbor provision will only apply to an OSP if it:
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the

18. See H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 20, 21 (1998). The DMCA was designed to
implement the treaties signed by the United States and other countries at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), which “would have amended Title 17 of the United States Code to
grant copyright owners a new right against ‘circumvention’ of ‘technological protection measures,’
and to establish new provisions dealing with the integrity of ‘copyright management information.’”
Id. at 20. The House bill to implement the DMCA, H.R. 2281, included two titles to be
implemented: “Title I would implement the WIPO treaties; and Title II would provide for limitations
on copyright infringement liability for on-line and other service providers.” Id. at 21.
19. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers
for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 29 (2006) (citing Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure 114–24 (1995)). The DMCA as a whole was drafted based on
the recommendations of the Clinton Administration’s Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights (Working Group), which stressed that while OSPs were in the unique situation of best
knowing the activities of their subscribers and how to stop illicit activities, there nevertheless was
“the need to reduce liability in special circumstances given the diversity of services offered” by
OSPs. Id.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2010).
21. Id.§ 512(k)(1)(B).
22. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
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service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates
23
and does not interfere with standard technical measures.

Given the importance of qualifying for safe harbor immunity, some of
the terms have required further clarification. Where an “adopted and
reasonably implemented” policy is concerned, case law has not yet defined
the terms to any real degree of certainty.24 “Standard technical measures”25
have been defined under the DMCA as those measures used “by copyright
owners to identify or protect copyrighted works,”26 which “have been
developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service
providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process.” 27
A. Safe Harbor Immunity
After defining what an OSP is, the next question is how one can qualify
for safe harbor immunity. An eligible OSP’s activities must fall under one
of the four respective categories in subsections (a) through (d): (1) transitory
digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information
residing on systems or networks at direction of users, and (4) information
location tools.28 YouTube is most concerned with the third category, under
512(c), as its activities are primarily concerned with UGC that is uploaded
and moved upon explicit user direction.29 Under section 512(c), an OSP
providing services similar to that of YouTube is rendered immune from
copyright infringement liability if it:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity uses the material on
the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and

23. Id. § 512(i)(1).
24. See Kim, supra note 7, at 54 (citing several different methods that courts nevertheless held
to qualify as reasonable implementation).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
26. Id. § 512(i)(2).
27. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A).
28. Id. § 512(a)–(d).
29. See About YouTube, supra note 3.
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(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing
30
or to be the subject of infringing activity.

Certain terms under section 512(c) have required further elaboration.
As what constitutes “actual knowledge” can be problematic to define,
Congress has recommended a “red flag” test31 that contains both a subjective
and an objective element in determining whether an OSP possessed “actual
knowledge.”32 While an OSP under this test “need not monitor its service or
affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity (except to the extent
consistent with a standard technical measure),”33 an OSP aware of a red flag
must expeditiously remove it lest it loses its safe harbor immunity.34
However, because each case will obviously differ in facts and
circumstances, Congress has stated that “it is not possible to identify a
uniform time limit for expeditious action.”35
As for case law, courts have opted to apply a narrow definition in
determining what would constitute “actual knowledge” and thus trigger an
OSP’s obligation to act. In Viacom, the district court held that where the
actual or constructive knowledge of copyright infringement is concerned,
there must be “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.”36 The
holding was later substantially affirmed by the Second Circuit37 because “to
require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or
awareness” would culminate into an ill-constructed and formless obligation
to take “commercially reasonable steps” in light of only a general awareness

30. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C).
31. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998).
32. Id. The subjective standard determines “the subjective awareness of the service provider
of the facts or circumstances in question,” while the objective standard observes “whether infringing
activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances.” Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Specifically, the report states that:
“[O]nce a service provider obtains actual knowledge or awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing material or activity on the service provider’s system
or network is apparent, the service provider does not lose the limitation of liability . . . if
it acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material.”
Id.
35. Id. at 53–54.
36. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 676
F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
37. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012).
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of infringing activity,38 and because this requirement would not be
reconcilable with section 512(c).39
B. The Takedown Notice
The takedown notices sent by copyright holders are central to the safe
harbor immunity for OSPs such as YouTube in relation to the wording of
section 512(c). On one hand, OSPs must have established an agent able to
receive these notices;40 on the other, the DMCA states that claims of alleged
infringement by copyright holders must “substantially”41 include:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner
of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed;
(ii) Identification of the copyright work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple
copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a
representative list of such works at that site;
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material;
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and if available, an electronic
mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted;
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law; and
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
42
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

Notices that therefore substantially comply with the aforementioned
requirements will prompt OSPs to act “expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of

38. Id. at 30–31.
39. Id. According to the court’s reasoning, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires the OSP to
act “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” the specific material in question, which could not
simultaneously operate with an order to require expeditious removal where there was no specific
knowledge or awareness of any infringing material. Id.; see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter
Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Requiring specific knowledge of
particular infringing activity makes good sense in the context of the DMCA.”).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2010).
41. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
42. Id.
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infringing activity,”43 lest they run afoul of their obligations under section
512(c) and lose their safe harbor immunity.
C. The Counter Notice
It is imperative to remember that the entire UGC notification process
does not merely revolve around the demands of copyright holders alone;
equally important are the requests made by users to have their videos
returned to their previously re-uploaded places. Upon content takedown,
OSPs are directed to take “reasonable steps” to notify the subscriber of this
fact.44 The DMCA has created a counter-notification process in which users
accused of copyright infringement can alert OSPs that they have a “good
faith” belief that the material uploaded was not infringing.45
To be effective, a counter-notification sent to an OSP must
“substantially”46 include:
(A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber;
(B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been
disabled and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or
access to it was disabled;
(C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief
that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification
of the material to be removed or disabled; and
(D) The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the
subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial
district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of
the United States, for any judicial district in which the service providers may be
found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who
47
provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person.

Upon receiving a counter-notification, the OSP must promptly provide
the copyright holder, who originally sent the takedown notice, a copy of the
counter notice,48 alerting them that the removed material will no longer be
disabled and will be put back online in ten business days,49 unless the
copyright holder decides to file a lawsuit before that time and notifies the

43. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
44. Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
45. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
46. Id. § 512(g)(3).
47. Id.
§
512(g)(3)(A)–(D);
see
Counter-Notification
www.youtube.com/t/copyright_counter (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
48. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
49. Id.

Basics,

YOUTUBE,
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OSP to that effect.50 Should no such notification from the copyright holder
arrive after being sent a copy of the user’s counter-notification, the OSP is
ordered to restore the material no more than fourteen days after receiving the
counter notice.51
D. Misrepresentation Claims
Congress anticipated that copyright holders may become overzealous or
possibly abusive in claiming copyright infringement; therefore, section
512(f) was implemented as a way to establish “a right of action against any
person who knowingly misrepresents”52 any material or online activity to be
infringing, with defendants guilty of such actions liable for “any damages,
including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by any of these parties as a
result of the service provider’s reliance upon the misrepresentation.”53 It
was Congress’s intention that this section would deter copyright holders
from making “knowingly false allegations .†.†. in recognition that such
misrepresentations are detrimental to rights holders, service providers, and
Internet users.”54
Section 512(f) creates a federal cause of action for misrepresentation
and in its entirety states:
(f) Misrepresentations.––Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section––
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or
misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and [attorney’s]
fees incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s
authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such
misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such
misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity
claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable
55
access to it.

Succinctly stated, a section 512(f) claim can be brought by either a
copyright holder or by a user of a UGC site in order to seek damages for

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 49 (1998).
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
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misrepresentation caused either by the copyright holder’s takedown notice or
the user’s counter-notice.
While the black letter text of the statute appears equitable, as applied in
case law section 512(f) has made bringing successful misrepresentation
claims more challenging. Two cases in particular stand out.
1. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America56
Michael J. Rossi owned and operated a website under the domain name
“internetmovies.com” since 1997 and described the website as an “online
magazine” that gave users a directory of websites that provided information
about movies.57 Visitors were told that obtaining membership would allow
them to “download full length movies .†.†. every month.”58
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is an American
trade association that provides ratings and content protection for films.59
After becoming aware of Rossi’s website, the MPAA sent several takedown
notices to both Rossi and his internet service provider (ISP).60 Rossi
subsequently found another ISP to host internetmovies.com, and filed suit
against the MPAA for a number of state claims; however, none of them
included a section 512(f) claim of misrepresentation.61 Notwithstanding the
absence of a section 512(f) claim, the Ninth Circuit decided to review de
novo the district court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act62 and discussed
section 512(f) anyway.63
Although Rossi did not dispute that the MPAA complied with the
DMCA takedown procedures under section 512(c)(3), he argued “the
MPAA did not have sufficient information to form a ‘good faith belief’
under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) that [he] was illegally infringing the MPAA
copyrights.”64 In the course of considering Rossi’s contention, the Ninth
Circuit opted for a subjective good faith standard instead of an objective
standard.65 Because Rossi’s website contained statements such as “Full

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
law and

Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1001–02.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002–03.
Id. at 1004–05.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004. In deciding which standard to apply, the Ninth Circuit looked to prior case
the statutory structure of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) to come to its conclusion that subjective good
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Length Downloadable Movies”; “NOW DOWNLOADABLE”; and “Join to
download full length movies online now! new movies every month,” the
Court held that the “unequivocal language used by Rossi . . . virtually
[compelled]” the conclusion “that motion pictures owned by MPAA
members were available for immediate downloading from the website,”66 a
conclusion that Rossi admitted.67
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit expounded on the required
subjective state of mind necessary to bring a valid claim for
misrepresentation. According to the Court, a copyright holder under section
512(f) “cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made,
even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.
Rather, there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of
misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.”68
2. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.69
On February 7, 2007, Stephanie Lenz uploaded a twenty-nine second
video recording of her children onto YouTube.70 For twenty-one seconds in
the video, the song “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince could be heard in the
background, “albeit with difficulty given the poor sound quality of the
video.”71 Several months later, copyright holder Universal issued a DMCA
takedown notice to YouTube and demanded that YouTube remove the video
Lenz later sent YouTube a counterfor copyright infringement.72
notification, asserting that her video constituted fair use73 of the song and
faith belief on the part of copyright holders was the proper standard. Id. For the full implication of
the subjective standard, see infra note 81.
66. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005.
67. Id.
68. Id (citation omitted).
69. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
70. Id. at 1151–52.
71. Id. at 1152.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1155. 17 U.S.C. § 107 lists the four factors considered in determining fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
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thus did not infringe upon any copyright.74 The video was reposted six
weeks later.75
Although Lenz saw the return of her video, she nevertheless filed suit
against Universal for misrepresentation under section 512(f) in addition to
claims of tortious interference against her contract with YouTube.76 The
court considered whether section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) of the DMCA “requires a
copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a good faith
belief that ‘use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized
by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.’”77 The Lenz court first noted
that when issuing a takedown notice, copyright holders must, among other
requirements, provide a statement that they possess “a good faith belief that
the use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”78 However, the court also stated that
while a full investigation by a copyright holder to verify the accuracy of its
own claims of infringement was not required, it nevertheless had to consider
the fair use doctrine as part of its initial review as to whether the takedown
notice should be issued in the first place.79 Therefore, in order to make a
takedown request in good faith, “the owner must evaluate whether the
material makes fair use of the copyright.”80
Nonetheless, the earlier holding requiring subjective bad faith in Rossi is
still applicable in Lenz given that both cases operate under Ninth Circuit
jurisdiction. Thus, although a copyright holder has to consider possible fair
use in making a takedown notice, a user nevertheless is still required to
provide evidence of subjective bad faith on the copyright holder’s part when
it decided to issue the takedown notification.81
III. A CHANGE IS REQUIRED
YouTube’s existing mode of operation can probably be described as
troublesome at best from the point of view of its users. Although Congress

74. Id. at 1152.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1153.
77. Id. at 1154.
78. Id. at 1153; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
79. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56.
80. Id. at 1154.
81. See supra note 68; see also Kathleen O’Donnell, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. and the
Potential Effect of Fair Use Analysis Under the Takedown Procedures of § 512 of the DMCA, 2009
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 19 (2009) (“The subjective bad faith standard imposed by Rossi makes it
exceedingly difficult for an end-user to succeed in a claim for misrepresentation against a copyright
holder.”).

38

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss1/2

12

Tarbell: Don't Tread on Me: The Need for an Alternate Dispute Resolution P

[Vol. 14: 27, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

has attempted to address all possible issues, the DMCA as executed does not
equitably balance the needs of all parties involved.
In 2011 the number of takedown notices sent by copyright holders to
OSPs for any kind of infringing material whatsoever was at an all-time high,
and the number only grows higher with every passing year.82 In October
2011 alone, 3,904 copyright holders and reporting organizations filed an
astonishing combined total of approximately 8,500,000 takedown requests to
Google alone, YouTube’s purchaser83 for URLs alone.84 This number would
be even higher were it not for: (1) the infringement report caps implemented
by Google;85 (2) Google’s decision to filter out copyright removal requests
received for other products aside from just Google Search;86 and (3)
Google’s decision to filter out takedown requests sent by means other than
Google’s online web form.87
YouTube itself is no exception even when solely considered; MITresearch project YouTomb tracks videos taken down from YouTube for
supposed copyright infringement.88 In monitoring just the top 450,000
popular videos present on YouTube in 2009, not taking into account the
number of videos taken down by YouTube’s own Content ID, YouTomb

82. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright
(last visited Nov. 15, 2012). As Google’s graph demonstrates, the number of requests in large part
only continue to grow. Id.
83. See supra note 4; see also Jonathan Bailey, Why Are Google DMCA Notices
Skyrocketing?, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Sept. 11, 2012), www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/9/11/whygoogle-dmca-notices-skyrocketing/.
84. A large amount of takedown requests sent for copyright infringement in general are
automated, created when material scanned through computer filters triggers an alarm. See, e.g., Dave
Neal, Warner Brothers Criticised for ‘Robo Takedowns’, THE INQUIRER (Mar. 7, 2012, 11:22AM),
www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2157660/warner-brothers-criticised-robo-takedowns;
Ernesto,
Microsoft DMCA Notice ‘Mistakenly’ Targets BBC, Techcrunch, Wikipedia, and U.S. Govt,
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/microsofts-bogus-dmca-notices-censor-bbccnn-wikipedia-spotify-and-more-121007/. For an example of what an automated or “robo” takedown
looks like, see Images DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS,
www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512c/notice.cgi?NoticeID=205681 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
85. Music Notes Blog, Some Clear Facts About Google’s “Transparency” Report, RIAA,
(May 30, 2012), http://riaa.com/blog.php?content_selector=riaa-news-blog&blog_selector=ClearFacts-&blog_type=&news_month_filter=5&news_year_filter=2012.
86. See supra note 82 (“Requests for products other than Google Search (e.g., requests
directed at YouTube or Blogger) are not included.”).
87. See supra note 82 (“Requests submitted by means other than our web form, such as fax or
written letter are not included.”).
88. About, YOUTOMB, youtomb.mit.edu/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
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detected that at least 9,760 were taken down after a takedown notice was
sent by a copyright holder.89
There would be nothing wrong with any of the aforementioned statistics
if it were assumed that each and every takedown notice was for genuinely
infringing material. Yet, in 2009, Google published a report noting that
more than half of the takedown notices it received under the DMCA (57%)
were sent by businesses against their competitors, and over a third of all
notices (37%) were invalid copyright claims.90 The list of material that can
and has been subject to takedowns extended to seemingly unfathomable
levels in just 2012: the sounds of nature that were overheard when a user
recorded and uploaded a video of him harvesting plants to make a salad;91 a
livestream of Michelle Obama’s speech at the 2012 Democratic National
Convention;92 NASA’s public domain footage of the Curiosity rover landing
on Mars;93 a video of President Obama singing the opening line to Al
Green’s “Let’s Stay Together” assembled by the Mitt Romney presidential
campaign staff;94 and the Hugo Awards’ livestream in September of that
year.95
Even if the media conglomerates responsible apologize, and claim that
their copyright detection algorithms detected a false positive, the fact
remains that this is not the first time, or even one of the few times, that this

89. Video Status, YOUTOMB, youtomb.mit.edu/statistics (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). Some of
the biggest issuers of takedown notices in 2009 included: Warner Music Group (approximately 935
videos); Viacom International, Inc. (approximately 419 videos); TV TOKYO Corporation
(approximately 309 videos); and BBC Worldwide, Ltd., (approximately 206 videos). Id.
90. European Digital Rights, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a Model?,
edri.org/files/0409_unintcons.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); Mike Masnick, Google Provides
Numbers on Just How Often DMCA Takedown Process is Abused, TECHDIRT (Mar. 18, 2009,
9:19AM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20090315/2033134126.shtml; see also Ted Gibbons, Google
Submission Hammers Section 92A, PCWORLD NEW ZEALAND (Mar. 15, 2009),
http://pcworld.co.nz/pcworld/pcw.nsf/feature/google-submission-hammers-section-92a.
91. Andy Baio, Copyright Kings are Judge, Jury and Executioner on YouTube, WIRED (Feb.
29, 2012), www.wired.com/business/2012/02/opinion-baiodmcayoutube/. The company that claimed
copyright was Rumblefish, a music licensing company. Id.
92. Ryan Singel, YouTube Flags Democrats’ Convention Video on Copyright Grounds,
WIRED (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:10 AM), www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/youtube-flags-democratsconvention-video-on-copyright-grounds/.
93. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed Into a DMCA Takedown, MOTHERBOARD,
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-takedown (last visited
Dec. 14, 2012).
94. Timothy B. Lee, Music Publisher Uses DMCA to Take Down Romney Ad of Obama
Crooning, ARSTECHNICA (Jul. 16 2012, 4:59 PM), www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/majorlabel-uses-dmca-to-take-down-romney-ad-of-obama-crooning/.
95. Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, IO9 (Sep.
3, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcement-robots-killed-the-hugoawards.
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has happened. For example, Scripps News Service, the private corporation
responsible for the takedown of the Curiosity Mars rover livestream, was
also responsible for the temporary takedown of a video of one of NASA’s
space shuttles being ferried by a 747 in April of the same year.96 According
to NASA, NASA either suffers inaccurate takedowns of their videos
approximately once a month or is forcibly inundated with ads from the
fraudulent copyright infringement claimant, with claims covering almost
everything from “imagery to music.”97
Even worse than false positives is when copyright holders are
unapologetically abusive concerning the scope of their takedown abilities.
In 2011, Universal Music Group (UMG) issued a takedown notice against
Megaupload’s “Mega Song,” hosted on YouTube, even though it did not
own the rights to anything in the video.98 By means of a rebuttal, UMG
responded that it had the “right to block or remove user-posted videos
through YouTube’s [copyright management system] based on a number of
contractually specified criteria” through a supposedly private contractual
agreement with YouTube which lay outside of the DMCA’s provisions.99
Although YouTube later refuted UMG’s statement to the contrary, troubling
questions are nevertheless raised concerning UMG’s attempt to circumvent
the DMCA takedown rules. The uploading user cannot even utilize the
provisions the DMCA has allotted against the infringement claimant even
though it was a supposed “non-DMCA takedown” because of UMG’s goal
that even if it takes down a video that it does not own the copyright to, the
uploading user cannot even utilize the provisions the DMCA has allotted
against the infringement claimant because it was a supposed “non-DMCA
takedown.” 100
Despite all these aforementioned statistics and examples, YouTube has
nevertheless said that it will “not manually review copyright-infringement
claims before its system automatically blocks disputed footage,” but instead
96. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed into a DMCA Takedown, MOTHERBOARD,
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-takedown (last visited
Dec. 14, 2012).
97. Id.
98. Timothy B. Lee, UMG Claims “Right to Block or Remove” YouTube Videos it Doesn’t
Own, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 15, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/12/umgwe-have-the-right-to-block-or-remove-youtube-videos/.
99. Id.
100. Id. YouTube later stated that “Our partners do not have the right to take down videos from
YouTube unless they own the rights to them or they are live performances controlled through
exclusive agreements with their artists,” and reinstated the “Mega Song.” Id.
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opts to send some of the flagged material to the copyright holders itself to
decide if there has been an infringement violation.101 This is somewhat
unfortunate since copyright holders cannot be considered a neutral party and
have been shown to make fraudulent claims a high percentage of the time;
yet at the same time, users who wish to sue copyright holders must first
obtain proof of subjective bad faith before a valid claim for
misrepresentation can be brought.102
In short, a change is required. Comparing the millions of takedown
requests generated every single day to the comparatively small number of
counter-notice claims sent by users103 suggests that the DMCA in actual
practice has created a system with high disparity in regards to each party’s
ability to be heard. While one reason why the number of counternotifications created is not higher can likely be attributed to some users’
ignorance that there is a dispute process to begin with, let alone how it even
works; another reason can stem from users’ reluctance to send a counternotification at all. This reluctance is known as the chilling effect.
A. Payment
Currently, any resolution process for infringement claims on YouTube
is litigation-based. As stated earlier, a user who files a counter-notification
exposes himself or herself, among other things, to a possible lawsuit in a
federal district court should the copyright holder decide to file suit.104
Litigation can be prohibitively expensive, especially if a party appeals a
judgment it consider unfavorable. As the average person who has witnessed
a takedown of his material most likely is not financially prepared (if ever) to
pay legal fees, the costs of litigation alone can stand as a considerable
counterweight in the litigation process.

101. David Kravets, Google Says It Won’t ‘Manually’ Review YouTube Vids for Infringement,
WIRED (Oct. 4, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/youtube-infringement/.
102. See supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text.
103. As of this writing, there does not seem to be any available list that tracks the total amount
of counter-notifications filed by YouTube users against claims of alleged infringement by copyright
holders. However, given the stringent requirements to file just a single counter-notification, see
supra notes 46-47, and the fact that copyright holders can and have sent as an aggregate whole
millions of takedown requests many of which are automated via copyright “bots” which require no
human time or review before they are sent, see supra note 83, it is incredibly unlikely that the total
amount of counter-notifications created can even come close in comparison let alone match or
surpass.
104. See supra note 47.
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B. Balance of Power
Given the aforementioned DMCA provisions and case law listed prior in
Part II, it would not be incongruous to state that copyright holders possess an
impetus to achieve their objectives that supersedes what a typical user might
normally have. Succinctly restated: (1) a copyright holder only has to
“substantially” include the requirements listed under the DMCA in issuing a
takedown notice;105 (2) an OSP must act expeditiously to remove or disable
access to the allegedly infringing material once served with the takedown
notice;106 (3) infringing material can be taken down, monetized with ads, or
tracked (all possible before any notification is sent by the OSP to the
user);107 (4) an OSP must only take “reasonable steps” to notify users of a
counter-notification process;108 (5) a counter notice submitted by a user
provides his or her personal information and exposes him or her to federal
court jurisdiction;109 (6) a copyright holder is only liable in a suit for
misrepresentation if the user provides evidence that the misrepresentation
was done with subjective bad faith;110 and (7) while a copyright holder must
take into account possible fair use in deciding to issue a takedown notice, the
standard is nevertheless still based upon a subjective good faith belief on the
part of the copyright holder.111
With all these conditions arranged in such a manner that clearly benefits
the copyright holder over the user, it is not surprising that many users decide
to forego the counter-notification process altogether, creating the previously
mentioned chilling effect. The resulting situation is justifiably worrisome,
as the lack of an opposing side willing to dispute claims can only lead to
abuse and exploitation of the takedown process. If no real incentive exists
on the part of users to dispute infringement claims, then there is nothing
preventing an unscrupulous copyright holder from taking advantage through
fraudulent means and misrepresentation to censor and control whatever
UGC they wish with impunity.
It is clear that the current DMCA process urgently requires renovation.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2010).
See supra note 30.
See supra note 12.
See supra note 44.
See supra note 47.
See supra note 65.
See supra notes 77–80.
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IV. ONLINE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS THE NEW DISPUTE
PARADIGM
While the issues previously listed in this article have been discussed
before in varying lengths, a clarion call has yet to be made for the
application of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in regard to UGC
disputes, let alone an online ADR process (ODR). In contrast to the existing
litigation-friendly paradigm, this article posits that ODR is much more likely
to achieve an equitable result than both traditional litigation and ADR, while
ensuring that all parties have a chance to make their voices heard.
As stated in Part II, the DMCA was enacted in 1998 with the goal of
modernizing copyright law in light of the new technological age brought on
by the Internet.112 However, since the DMCA’s initial inception, both
technology and the American legal system have evolved, thus adding on
new techniques that Congress could not have completely foreseen. The
concept of ODR is a byproduct of that technological evolution.
A. Location-Based Jurisdiction and its Problems
Traditionally, having both parties arrive at a specific physical location to
litigate has worked well enough in administering justice. In these disputes,
two issues (personal and subject matter jurisdiction) have been important,
especially if the two opposing parties hailed from different states.
Parties could avoid the uncertainty of the personal jurisdiction
determinations by agreeing to a forum selection clause from the outset, like
how YouTube users currently agree to federal court jurisdiction if they
submit a counter-notification in response to a video takedown.113 Forum
selection clauses can be convenient because they preclude personal
jurisdiction issues since the parties have already agreed upon where to
However, although forum selection clauses can provide
litigate.114
predictability and contribute to the efficiency of the judicial system, they can
be held inequitable in practice, as it is a possibility that the party drafting the
forum selection clause will choose a jurisdiction that is beneficial for its

112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
113. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Permissive or Mandatory Nature of Forum Selection
Clauses Under State Law, 32 A.L.R. 6th 419 § 2 (2008); see supra notes 44-47.
114. See J. Zak Ritchie, A Tie that Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability in West
Virginia, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 95, 96 (2010) (“[F]orum selection clauses . . . may reduce uncertainty
as to where a potential plaintiff will file suit.”).
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purposes,115 whether it be in terms of the distance needed to travel or, a more
favorable jury pool. Forum selection clauses also exist under their own
analogous sword of Damocles—an ever-present risk that the clause itself
might become the subject of litigation and possibly held by a court to be
unconscionable and thus void for any number of reasons.116 Lastly, even a
perfectly equitable forum selection clause can still cost litigants a high fee
amount in both court costs and travel expenses. As long as the current
paradigm revolves around an assumption of litigation through physical
presence in a courtroom, the previously mentioned issues will never be fully
assuaged.
B. Introducing Online Dispute Resolution and its Benefits
The general advantages of ADR mechanisms and processes when
compared to traditional litigation have not gone unnoticed by legal analysts
and scholars.117 In contrast to physical litigation and ADR, ODR resolves all
physical issues of personal jurisdiction, as the forum in which grievances
would are be aired is an online interactive medium that is closest to the
nearest accessible (and hopefully secure) computer with an Internet

115. See, e.g., Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce
Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient, and Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1,
32–33 (2009).
116. For example, two possible reasons include if the forum selection clause’s enforcement
“would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, whether declared
by statute or by judicial decision,” or if the forum clause would be “seriously inconvenient for the
trial of the action.” M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972). Other reasons
can include fraud or overreaching or if a forum selection clause would cost an out-of-state plaintiff
more via litigation than the actual cost of the damages as a way to deter any litigation. Id.; see
Galves, supra note 115, at 31.
117. See Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 18–24
(2004) (stating that traditional litigation is “inconvenient, impractical, time-consuming, and
prohibitive,” and that ADR is non-confrontational, efficacious, neutral, and less costly among other
benefits); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR,
15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 675–76 (2000) (noting that “ADR mechanisms offer lower
costs, reassure participants, and solve the jurisdictional problem because use of them manifests
consent” as well as containing a “readily available fund” to satisfy a decision for either party);
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982) (“Mediation offers some
clear advantages over adversary processing: it is cheaper, faster, and potentially more hospitable to
unique solutions that take more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants.”); John
Hartje, Chapter 48. Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 N.Y. PRAC., COM. LITIG. IN NEW YORK STATE
COURTS § 48:2 (3d ed.) (asserting that whereas traditional litigation can be costly and that the “vast
majority of cases settle or are otherwise resolved before trial,” it is better to use ADR to expedite
early settlement before legal fees mount).
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connection. Even ADR, the benefits of which will be discussed in the
following paragraphs, still necessitates that the parties meet somewhere
physically. Requiring only a computer would mitigate any travel expenses
or inconveniences, and any attempt by one party to have a “home turf”
advantage by being more familiar with the jurisdiction’s judges or jury pool
than the other party is either lessened or eliminated.118 In this sense, ODR
would act as the great equalizer, ensuring that any disparity the dispute may
commence with is reduced as much as possible.
As noted by other authors, ADR has generally been construed as more
cooperative than courtroom litigation since ADR removes “many of the cold
formalities . . . that often result in bitterness between parties,”119 such as
motions or other tactics that can be abused in order to obfuscate the issues,
delay litigation, and pile up legal fees. In contrast, ADR would minimize
the chances of pointless protraction occurring in the first place because such
methods are not normally available in an ADR setting.120
The comparative efficacy and haste with which ADR cases are resolved
when compared to their litigious brethren is also something that should be
taken into account. Trials can take months to resolve––not accounting for
the wait before a case is even heard in the first place121––whereas ADR can
resolve a case in weeks.122
Another advantage of ODR is that unlike ADR and traditional litigation,
parties would not have to look at each other while negotiating. This can be
beneficial for parties that are completely unaccustomed to any sort of legal
proceeding (although an ideal ODR system would have a video counterpart
available if needed). While for some this might be considered detracting
because it would “dehumanize” the parties, for others that exact reason
might be considered a boon. When a party is staring at a computer screen
instead of an actual live audience, fears that might stem from public
speaking anxieties or difficulties are diminished, and the parties have an
opportunity to carefully think over their entries prior to written submission

118. Galves, supra note 115, at 32.
119. Id. at 40.
120. Id. at 41. (“Because these motions do not exist in an ADR forum, it improves the chances
that the bitterness inherent in the beginning stages of traditional litigation will be avoided by the use
of ADR.”).
121. David A. Hoffman, et al., Alternatives to Litigation, CIVP MA-CLE § 10.1, § 10.4.1(b)
(2008). A case can sometimes wait three to five years before it is available for trial in both Superior
and Federal District Courts. Id.
122. See, e.g., Mark Albright, The Advantages and Disadvantages of ADR, ALBRIGHT
STODDARD BLOG (Sep. 21, 2012, 12:11 AM), www.albrightstoddard.com/blog/bid/223519/TheAdvantages-And-Disadvantages-of ADR; Alternative Dispute Resolution, SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO, www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/alternative_dispute_resolution/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012).

46

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss1/2

20

Tarbell: Don't Tread on Me: The Need for an Alternate Dispute Resolution P

[Vol. 14: 27, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

in order to ensure that only the most developed arguments are submitted.
The absence of immediate human interaction in front of an opposing party
also means that the other party cannot use physical, intimidation, or
pressure, through body language, nor can any actual bias (classism,
personality, sexism, racism, bodily tics, etc.) come into play, as both parties
would be reduced to nothing more than their respective arguments on a
screen, something traditional litigation and ADR cannot provide given their
physical nature. The absence of these factors helps to ensure that the parties
are focused solely on the issue at hand without any distracting nuances.
Additionally, each party would be able to post at its own convenience
since the two parties are not stuck in a singular physical location during the
proceedings (although it could certainly be argued that this has its own
advantages by making the parties more invested in coming to an equitable
agreement), or the parties could agree to a specific online session in order to
work through things as quickly as possible. To ensure efficiency and haste,
the parties could also agree under ODR to make their arguments at their
convenience as long as all submissions are within a certain time frame. Not
only would this ensure that each party to make the best arguments for its
positions, but this method would also guarantee flexibility in submissions.
Furthermore, ADR and ODR are more advantageous than traditional
litigation in that they permit private resolution rather than a public
resolution.123 This can be beneficial to the parties if they wish to assert their
claims, however tenuous they may be, but possess a desire to avoid public
embarrassment or humiliation by a loss in the judicial system. In arbitration,
for example, the final resolution is made public “only if one of the parties
seeks intervention by the court to enforce, modify, or vacate the decision” of
the arbitrator.124
Lastly, because all arguments and files uploaded in ODR would be
recorded and accessible by the parties, it would provide an easily accessible
method for either party should any later disagreements arise during
enforcement of the ODR resolution.125

123. See supra note 121, at § 10.4.1(a).
124. See id.
125. Although it is not unlikely that lawyers would be available for certain parties, the point of
ODR is to provide for an alternative dispute resolution forum where the common layperson would
be able to air their grievances and requests. This latter point is of particular import here, as it is
unlikely that the average UGC-site user would hire a lawyer (whose legal fees can be prohibitively
expensive) to dispute something so small as a YouTube video (unless they had stronger ties to it,
such as if it were their own original product, for example).
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C. Enforcement and Appeals
Should a dispute come to a unsatisfying final resolution for all the
parties involved, the ideal ODR system126 would have an appeal process that
would permit each party to submit its respective appellate briefs, which
would allow for a different ODR judge127who would either affirm or deny
the previous resolution. This would ensure that there is an enacted appeals
process available for those who feel that justice has not been served, yet still
remain comparatively less expensive and time-consuming than traditional
litigation or ADR.
Enforcement would not be an issue here as the resolution, as far as UGC
is concerned, is binary in nature. The material considered is either online or
offline and control over the material is not in the hands of either party but
under YouTube (or any other analogous OSP) itself. All that would be
required would be a notice sent to YouTube to alert it of the final resolution
between the two disputing parties and for it to comply with the instructions
contained therein.
V. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Although implementing ODR as a replacement for the current litigationfriendly paradigm would make the YouTube dispute process much more
equitable for both parties as a whole, additional steps must be taken in order
to ensure that ODR is a worthwhile process for those involved. These steps
require that: (1) ODR must be offered prior to takedown in at least some
capacity; (2) larger fines should be levied against copyright infringement
claimants in cases of misrepresentation; (3) trust funds for representation
should be implemented in order to assist users in paying their ODR fees
during the process; and (4) the respective holdings in Rossi and Lenz should
be overruled.

126. In so far as the ODR system is concerned, while private companies such as Google could
adopt it, it might be better if there were a national system implemented in place by act of Congress;
the danger inherent with private corporations implementing their own ODR programs is the everpresent risk that they would try to influence the ODR system as much as they could in favor of
copyright holders so as to avoid lawsuits against the private companies themselves.
127. These ODR judges would be a neutral third party in the dispute, either hailing from a
hypothetical company that could be hired to provide qualified arbitrators who were familiar with
online technologies, or through a national governmental group which would assign said arbitrators as
needed. It is important that OSPs are not in charge of choosing the arbitrator, as there would be the
risk that they would choose arbitrators biased in favor towards copyright holders in order to avoid
any lawsuits against the OSP. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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A. ODR Must be Offered Prior to Takedown in at Least Some Capacity
As mentioned before, the current dispute process takes down allegedly
infringing material, and sends a contemporaneous notice to the user alerting
the user regardless if the action is based on a Content ID match or a
copyright holder takedown notice.128 It is only after the user submits a
dispute counter-notification and the copyright holder fails to respond, backs
down, or loses the lawsuit, that the user can have his or her material reposted
onto the site for public viewing.129 Copyright holders might argue that their
“take down first, ask questions later” ability is crucial in preventing
copyright infringement where new material has just been released. To some
degree, it is not difficult to see the validity of this line of thought. For
example, if a singer had just released his or her new album, and soon
thereafter, a user on YouTube started to provide free copies of it through one
of his or her videos in violation of a copyright, it would obviously be
imperative to take down the infringing material as soon as possible to
prevent illicit downloads. However, the problem is that it is too easy for
copyright holders to simply claim that all supposed matches found by their
detection algorithms are as immediately dire of a situation as the one
presented above when that might not be the case at all (leaving aside the
aforementioned topic of whether the claimed materials infringed upon is
even theirs in the first place).
A grace period, even if it is a day or two, should be offered by OSPs so
that the user can be notified and be given a chance to dispute the takedown
notice/Content ID match through ODR before the material is taken offline,
even if the time period is as short as a day or two. Any time frame would
conceptually be superior to the current system, where the user is already
placed at a disadvantage. This concession may seem to be too much for
copyright holders, but it is not impossible to conceive that the user, who is
an independent artist, for example, desperately needs the material to be
available for public consumption and sharing in order to advertise. A
takedown of any sort (erroneous or otherwise) would take time away from
dispute/litigation that would otherwise have been used for the advertising
effort or for other needs. It is certainly possible that by the time the user is
able to get the material reposted online, it is too late and the damage is done.
This “critical point in time” argument is, at best, inequitable. Once ODR

128.
129.

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49–51.
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starts, if the user fails to demonstrate that he or she owns the rights to the
material at issue or can raise a defense, such as fair use, then the usual
section 512(f) misrepresentation penalties would apply130 along with any
other punitive measure that the OSP deems necessary. This would force
users to be more hesitant prior to introducing fraudulent claims in the hopes
of exploiting the new ODR dispute system and would encourage copyright
holders to participate more willingly.
Should YouTube and similar OSPs offer this new dispute process, it is
likely that copyright holders would attempt to bring lawsuit alleging that the
implementation of this new dispute plan is in violation of DMCA safe
harbor provisions. However, given the somewhat ambiguous language of
section 512(c) of the DMCA131 and since “actual knowledge” is contingent
upon “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements” by the OSP as
held by the court in Viacom,132 the OSPs could argue that providing the user
with a mandatory grace period to initiate ODR prior to automatic takedown
would not violate their duties to act expeditiously in removing or disabling
access to the allegedly infringing material133 that was found with imperfect
(and often automated) detection algorithms.134 After all, there is no uniform
time limit as to what would constitute an expeditious removal.135
The manual review of every single claim of copyright infringement on
YouTube is not being asked, since that would require astronomical costs136
and would be impracticable, if not impossible, to execute. However,
YouTube needs to engage in proactive behavior that would provide the user
with a chance to at least initiate ODR and offer his or her voice in the matter
before his or her material is taken down.

130. See supra notes 52–55.
131. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 36.
133. See supra note 30.
134. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 35.
136. Engineer Craig Mansfield calculated via a mathematical formula available on his website
that manually reviewing every single video for possible copyright infringement would require almost
200,000 judges working 120 work weeks every single week with no holidays in order to cover all the
new material coming in every second. Craig Mansfield, An Engineer’s Cost Analysis of Video
Screening
on
YouTube,
CRAIG’S
THAWTS
(May
23,
2012,
5:32
PM),
blog.cdmansfield.com/2012/05/23/an-engineers-cost-analysis-of-video-screening-on-youtube/.
It
would cost Google $37 billion a year. See Chase Hoffberger, Pre-screening Videos Would Cost
YouTube $37 Billion a Year, THE DAILY DOT (May 30, 2012), www.dailydot.com/news/youtubeprescreen-copyright-37-billion/;
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B. Larger Fines for Cases of Misrepresentation
On average, copyright holders send thousands of DMCA takedown
notices every year, and the number will only increase as time goes on.137
Unfortunately, as earlier examples have shown, the automated takedown
system is not perfect. Copyright holders are responsible for targeting and
taking down material that is unlikely to be subject to takedown in the first
place (the sounds of nature),138 content that is clearly for the public domain
yet is still subject to takedown monthly (videos posted by NASA taken
down by Scripp News Service),139 and even material they owned no rights to
(the Megaupload “Mega Song” and UMG’s subsequent remarks).140
Although these examples show a spectrum of copyright issues, with genuine
mistakes caused by inaccurate or deliberate actions taken, none of it matters
if copyright holders are not given serious incentives to remedy their actions.
Larger fines automatically placed on false claimants would guarantee that
copyright holders would not be nearly as eager to send out takedown notices
en masse if they were required to pay them for every single instance of
misrepresentation.
C. Representation Trust Fund
In addition to larger fines for instances of misrepresentation, users
would be much more likely to file a counter-notice and use the ODR dispute
process if their fees could be reduced to some degree. A nationwide trust
fund for legal representation for ODR users could be created by placing the
fines successfully levied against copyright holders. These fines would
encourage copyright holders to act more carefully in their takedown notices
and, allow future plaintiffs to use their comparatively newfound fiscal
freedom to initiate more disputes. A trust fund of this nature would also
provide peace of mind to users who wish to voice their complaints but are
reluctant to do so primarily due to their lack of funds.
To prevent less scrupulous users from selfishly emptying the entire trust
fund, the trust should be limited to a certain number of hours or a total
monetary amount, whichever comes first, and the rest of which would have

137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93, 96–97.
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
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to be paid by the user himself or herself. Although it does not wholly
account for all possible legal fees that may be incurred, some financial
assistance is better than none.
D. Overruling the Holdings in Rossi and Lenz
More than the other recommendations, overruling the joint holdings in
Rossi and Lenz is quite possibly the most important goal to achieve if users
are ever to make successful cases for misrepresentation should the parties
fail to come to a resolution via ODR and therefore, must pursue litigation.
As mentioned above:
Rossi held that a copyright holder could only have a subjective, not an
objective, good faith belief in determining whether to issue a takedown
notice.141 As the court stated in its opinion, a “copyright owner cannot be
liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright
owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.†.†. . Rather, there must be
a demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on the part
of the copyright owner.”142
Lenz held that copyright owners must make a good faith consideration
of whether the alleged infringing content constitutes fair use prior to sending
out a takedown notice and that this consideration was consistent with the
However, this
DMCA’s section 512(f) misrepresentation clause.143
consideration is somewhat limited in scope, as Rossi still holds, and thus
section 512(f) still only requires subjective bad faith.144 Taken to its logical
end, a user that uploaded UGC to an OSP, such as YouTube, would
therefore only successfully bring a cause of action for misrepresentation, let
alone win, if he or she can somehow procure and provide evidence of actual
subjective bad faith on the copyright holder’s part. This subjective standard
imposes an incredibly difficult obstacle to surpass on the part of the user,
making it very unlikely misrepresentation actions will be brought.
Although Rossi and Lenz are mandatory authority only in the Ninth
Circuit, they nevertheless stand out as persuasive authority to the rest of the
federal circuit courts should they eventually address the issue. More
jurisdictions adopting the Ninth Circuit’s holdings would be nothing short of
disastrous for users’ abilities to claim misrepresentation, especially when
nothing shows that copyright holders will cease making fraudulent
infringement claims anytime soon.

141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra note 65.
See supra note 68.
See supra note 65; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2010).
See supra note 66; O’Donnell, supra note 81, at 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Under the existing DMCA, the current dispute process for OSPs like
YouTube is solely focused on adversarial litigation: a process which in
practice unfortunately comes across as largely one-sided and inequitable to
the detriment of the users of said OSPs. This process is created in no small
part by a chilling effect in which users are reluctant to voice their grievances
due to a lack of monetary resources and legal experience. Adopting an
ODR-based approach would be more equitable in practice as it would allow
users a chance to voice to their opinions under a process that is less
expensive, more efficacious on average, and in a more cooperative manner.
To support ODR, a small grace period should be implemented allowing
users to enter into ODR with copyright holders prior to takedown, larger
fines should be placed against copyright holders for misrepresentation, a
nationwide trust fund should be formed to assist users in paying their legal
dues, and the subjective standard established and reinforced in Rossi and
Lenz should be replaced with an objective standard of misrepresentation.
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